Suchergebnisse

The article is devoted to analyzing various aspects of the impact of Brexit consequences on the states of the Scandinavian-Baltic region and the prospects for relations with them. It is noted that Brexit may lead to a slowdown in the economic growth of the countries of the region, but it will not be significant. At the same time, given the small scale of the economies and their dependence on the external economic situation, the Baltic countries will experience a relatively greater negative impact than the highly developed innovative economies of the Nordic states. Revision of the priorities for the EU funding will also lead to a decrease in subsidies within the framework of the cohesion policy and the implementation of infrastructure projects, which can be painful for the economies of the Baltic states. A change in the direction of migration flows from these countries is also highly likely. As for security and defense cooperation, changes are unlikely here, since the UK has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of collective defense within NATO. However, a reduction in the number of channels of interaction and coordination of positions in international affairs (as a natural consequence of withdrawal from EU political institutions) is likely to intensify UK participation in other formats of regional political and defense cooperation (NB+1, JEF, NORDEFCO, etc.).

The article is devoted to the relations of the Scandinavian-Baltic region states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden) and Ukraine in the military-political and economic spheres. These countries had engaged in Ukrainian affairs long before 2013−2014. This happened soon after «the Orange Revolution» and, then, the trend became more pronounced during the implementation of the program «Eastern Partnership». The most active actors on the Ukrainian track in their subregions are Sweden (until 2014 — one of the largest investors in its economy) and Lithuania, which in 2015 started to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine. The countries of the Scandinavian-Baltic region provide financial assistance to Ukraine which is symbolic compared to development aid, but considerable for Ukrainian economy. Financing is traditionally directed to promotion of effective public administration, democracy, human rights (including gender equality), systemic economic reforms, sustainable development (including energy efficiency), etc. From a strategic perspective, military cooperation of the Scandinavian-Baltic region countries with Ukraine is nominal as well. Against this background, completely divergent assessment of the situation in Ukraine continues to be the most important stumbling block in the relations between Russia and the states of the region. This does not give any grounds for early softening of their value-based foreign policy towards Russia.

The article reviews performance of a major infrastructure project in the Eastern Baltics – namely, construction of the highspeed railway «Rail Baltica/Rail Baltica II» (Helsinki – Tallinn – Riga – Vilnius – Warsaw –Berlin), the longest tracks of which will lead through territories of the Baltic States. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia consider the project strategically important in terms of elimination of infrastructural isolation of these countries from the rest of the European Union, which corresponds to an overall EU transport policy goal of creating a single European railway area. Although the prospects of economic payback of the Rail Baltica remain unclear, given high probability that the Project will be completed sooner or later, today both regional and external actors evaluate the potential cargo and passenger capabilities that may come with it.

In the post-Soviet period participation in NATO was one of the major goals of euro-atlantic integration for the Baltic states. Political leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have considered participation in the alliance as an important element of euro-atlantic solidarity which allows small - from all viewpoints - states claim decision-making over global issues. This satisfies demands of the political elites and victimized public consciousness for more security, makes it possible for elites to consider their states as bulwark against Russia. Throughout the whole decade, such reasoning has been reflected in doctrines and speeches of Baltic politicians. After joining NATO, the Baltic states became the most active supporters of a deeper integration in the military area and "open door" policy. They have continued reforming their armed forces and renovating military infrastructure. They have acquired "specialization" within NATO by establishing centers of excellence. In terms of euro-atlantic solidarity, the participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan has become the most important international project for the Baltic states. However, only Estonia managed to mount their defence expenses to the level of 2% GDP. During the "Ukranian crisis" the issue of Baltic membership in NATO acquired special importance. Confrontational rhetoric and appeals to "Russian threat" in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the one hand, make it possible for their political leaders to constantly demonstrate their importance in the eyes of Western partners and demand more activity of the alliance and, on the other hand, make ground for the political elites to consolidate the electorate, by that ensuring that the right-wing conservative forces remain in power.

The economic crisis fueled contradictions among the parties and weakened public support of internal and external policies of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Natural necessity to abandon previous one-sided Euro-Atlantic foreign political and foreign economic orientation in favor of more balanced approach towards relations with Eastern neighbours (primarily with Russia) has become the issue of key importance that turned out to be a stumbling block for main political parties (ruling parties, opposition, so called 'Russian' parties) in the Baltic states. The attitude to this problem became crucial during recent political crisis in Latvia, whereas in Lithuania and Estonia it led to changing rhetoric on foreign political issues by opposition parties. It is possible to nominally define the political situation in Lithuania as partisan consensus, whereas in Latvia and Estonia foreign political strategies complicated by unresolved domestic ethnic and language minorities problems are a battlegroud for ruling right-wing conservative coalitions and social-democratic oppositions. So, main social and political forces in the Baltic states faced the task to find a new consensus on foreign political issues in order to efficiently develop national economies under the conditions of financial economic turbulence in the EU and worldwide as well as to support social unity.

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Elaboration of single CAS of the armed services of Ukraine management, effective both in peaceful and in military time, is one of priorities of their development. This also includes introducing digital methods of transmission, reception and treatment of information, and automation of troops management process. Advantages of wireless information and telecommunication networks entailed their rapid spread and development of new standards along with improvement of existing ones, it can also be observed in the armed services. Among important issues while applying such technologies is the choice of type of wireless technology and network topology. Possibility to implement the combinatorial algorithm is considered for the accomplishment of topological task of wireless PCM at present limitations for the time of delay and reliability of message transmission in a network with the aim of its optimization. ; Створення єдиної автоматизованої системи управління ЗС України, ефективної як у мирний, так і у воєнний час, є одним із пріоритетів їх розвитку. До них належить й перехід на цифрові методи передачі, прийому і обробки інформації, автоматизація процесу управління військами. Переваги безпровідних інформаційно-телекомунікаційних мереж спричинили їх швидке поширення та розвиток нових й удосконалення існуючих стандартів, в збройних силах також. Серед важливих проблем застосування таких технологій є проблеми вибору типу бездротової технології і топології мережі. В статті розглянуто можливість використання комбінаторного алгоритму для розв'язку топологічної задачі бездротової ІКМ при наявних обмеженнях на час затримки і надійності передачі повідомлень в мережі з метою її оптимізації.

The article deals with the «total defense» concept considering it to be part of Sweden's strategic culture and provides an overview of how this concept defines Sweden's approach towards the defense cooperation within the EU. «Total defence» remains staple in the Swedish defence planning and the perception of risks to national security, but has not yet received sufficient attention from Russian researchers. The announced restoration of the effective total defense system potentially comparable to that of the period of bipolar confrontation is associated with significant difficulties due to the gradual reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War and the decentralization of the national crisis preparedness structures which was initiated in the early 2000s. The total defense itself also reveals tensions between the demands for consolidation and centralized decision-making and the liberal, open nature of the Swedish society and national economy, as well as the principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and similarity that underline the present Swedish emergency response system. The total defense, is, therefore, regarded as an attempt at creating an effective crisis preparedness system that would function successfully in a democratic society, both under the conditions of peace and potential armed conflict, without the need to declare an emergency and endow individual bodies or a selected group of individuals with exclusive powers. The Swedish strategic culture, therefore, stipulates that it is important not only to resolve a crisis effectively, but also to do so in a way which would not endanger the regular functioning of political institutions and the rule of law. Within the EU Sweden has earned credit for developing civilian or non-military elements of crisis management, while «more hardware» defense cooperation within PESCO and the European Defense Fund is defined by the pragmatic economic interests of Swedish defense companies rather than by strategic considerations. The Swedish Experience with «total defence» will continue to face the same dilemma – the need to rebuild a robust and self-reliant national defence while preserving the liberal principles in politics as well as in economy.